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Abstract 
Times of high unemployment always inspire debates on the role of labor market policy and 
its optimal implementation. This paper uses a dynamic model of search unemployment and 
bilateral wage bargaining to characterize optimal labor market policy in a possibly turbulent 
environment.  A  firing  externality,  generated  by  the existence  of  a  partial  unemployment 
insurance system, distorts the pre-policy equilibrium along three margins: job creation, job 
acceptance, and job destruction. Optimal policy is characterized by a payroll tax, a firing tax, 
and  a  hiring  subsidy.  Endogenous  job  acceptance  demands  that  a  firing  tax  and  a  hiring 
subsidy have to be set equal in any case and cannot be used to correct for the possible 
failure of the Hosios condition. In that case the optimal policy mix has to be extended by 
either an output or recruitment tax/subsidy. It is further shown that the derived policy mix is 
robust  to  the  introduction  of  economic  turbulence  in  form  of  state-dependent  worker 
transitions between skill classes. This is crucial as widely discussed intergroup redistribution 
schemes, like in-work benefits targeted at low-skilled workers, are rendered considerably 
less effective in that case. Instead of redistribution from high- to low-skilled workers or from 
firing firms to unemployed workers, the paper identifies a scheme involving redistribution 
from firing to hiring firms to be optimal. 
Keywords 
Search and matching, employment subsidies, economic turbulence, policy spill-over. 
JEL Classification 
E24, E61, J08 1 Introduction
Times of high unemployment always inspire debates on the role of labor market policy.
While most scholars agree that unemployment rates in the OECD, especially of low-skilled
workers, are excessively high, there is little consensus on what should be done about it,
leading to a variety of policy advice. Take for example the recent debate in Germany on
the controversial subject of which of two specic policy instruments should be introduced:
wage subsidies (e.g. Sinn et al., 2006) versus hiring subsidies (e.g. Brown et al., 2007).
While there exists much empirical work focusing on the relative eectiveness of specic
instruments, the aim of this paper is to develop a theoretical characterization of optimal
policy. We will employ a dynamic equilibrium model of search unemployment, rich enough
to incorporate three important decision margins: job creation, job acceptance, and job
destruction, in a possibly turbulent environment. Turbulence is introduced to the model,
in the spirit of Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998), as state-dependent transitions of workers
between skill classes, i.e. unemployed workers lose their skills in the course of time. This
adds an additional channel for policy spill-over to the framework which plays an important
role in case of policy targeting. Possible ineciencies of the initial, pre-policy equilibrium
come in the form of a typical search externality and a ring externality, which we will
focus on in more detail. The need to nance an existing partial unemployment insurance
(UI) system, not internalized by rms, gives rise to the latter externality. We introduce
a set of policy instruments: payroll, output and ring taxes as well as wage, hiring and
recruitment subsidies, while we do not allow for taxation of unemployed workers. The
analysis shows that the optimal policy mix can be characterized by a payroll tax as a scal
instrument set to nance the UI system and a 'ring tax equal hiring subsidy'-scheme
similar to Ligthart and Heijdra (2000) and Heijdra and Ligthart (2002), representing
redistribution from ring to hiring rms, to correct for the distortions. This contrasts
the results of Blanchard and Tirole (2008) (henceforth BT) who in a static approach,
neglecting job creation and acceptance, characterize optimal policy by redistribution
from ring rms to unemployed workers, which resembles the experience rating system
implemented in the United States. The derived optimal policy mix has to be expanded by
either an output or a recruitment tax/subsidy in case of 'unbalanced' search externalities
to correct for the failure of the Hosios (1990)-condition. An important nding is that the
characterization of optimal policy is robust to the introduction of economic turbulence.
This is crucial as a lot of existing policy advice is rendered considerably less eective in
that case. The cross-nanced wage subsidy scheme for low-skilled workers, representing
redistribution from high- to low-skilled workers, as proposed by Mortensen and Pissarides
(2003) (henceforth MP) is an example for such a policy advice. They assume skill classes to
operate in complete juxtaposition, except for the connection via the government's budget
3constraint, which underestimates the adverse eect on high-skilled workers who become
more picky concerning their acceptance and continuation decision as their fall back option
increases with the wage subsidy for low-skilled workers. In addition the skill composition
deteriorates as a result of such a targeting scheme.
This paper relates to several strands of the literature. As mentioned above there are
numerous empirical studies1 that deal with estimating the employment eects of various
policy instruments. But typical inference from comparing treated and untreated indi-
viduals to evaluate 'big scale' policies faces the following problems. First, a policy has
actually to be in place. Second, 'big scale' policies will induce general equilibrium eects
which lead to a violation of the necessary 'stable unit treatment value assumption' (see
Angrist et al., 1996). In their study on counseling, Cahuc and Barbanchon (2010) argue
how micro evaluations neglecting crowding out, adverse spill-over eects on non-targeted
persons, and other equilibrium eects can lead to misguided policy advice. We therefore
base our analysis on a model of equilibrium search unemployment rich enough to capture
those eects. Dynamic search and matching models have been widely used to evaluate
employment subsidies ever since the inuential paper of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).
However, the conclusions so far are mixed. While Bovenberg et al. (2000) and Cardullo and
Van der Linden (2006) argue that wage subsidies can substantially reduce unemployment,
Boone and van Ours (2004) and Oskamp and Snower (2008) nd no such eect. What
these type of studies typically have in common is that they embed the frictional labor
market in complex CGE-models which makes it hard to disentangle dierent eects or
draw conclusions concerning the optimal design of policy which is at the heart of our paper.
A more theoretical treatment - probably most closely related to this paper - is provided by
MP. They analytically derive optimal policy before presenting some simulation results for
non-optimal policy schemes. We will extend their analysis on several dimensions. First, in
their optimal policy characterization, MP solely concentrate on the distorting eects of
subsidies and taxes while scal eects are suppressed by allowing for non-distortionary
consumption taxes. Hence, the ring externality in the spirit of BT does not play a role
in their setting. Second, we introduce an additional margin (job acceptance) which will
alter optimal policy if search externalities are 'unbalanced'. Third and most importantly,
we introduce economic turbulence and discuss its role for policy design. Another closely
related paper is Michau (2009) who extends the BT-setting to a dynamic search and
matching framework. He explicitly models the UI problem with risk-averse workers and
nds that the welfare maximizing allocation is characterized by full insurance and output
1Empirical evidence on the eects of wage subsidies is summarized by Katz (1996) for the United
States, Bell et al. (1999) for the United Kingdom, and Bonin et al. (2002) for Germany. Boockmann et al.
(2007) provide some evidence on 'hiring subsidy'-like grants in Germany. A review on the empirical eects
of employment protection is presented in Lazear (1990).
4maximization. As Nash bargained wages with positive bargaining power of the workers
are incompatible with full insurance, he nds that in a second best a social planner would
reduce labor market tightness, implemented by a positive spread between a ring tax and
a hiring subsidy. This is done to reduce wages and therefore decrease under-provision of
UI. We do not consider this trade-o between insurance and output maximization here
by conditioning our analysis on the existence of a partial UI system as the focus lies
on role of economic turbulence in designing policy. The idea of economic turbulence is
inspired by work of Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998). While this strand of the literature,
including Pissarides (1992), Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004), and Den Haan et al. (2005), is
concerned with the inuence of skill depreciation during unemployment on the persistence
of unemployment, its implication for policy design has received little attention so far.
The outline of the paper is as follows. First, a simple intragroup model is developed
featuring only one skill class. The optimal policy mix, implementing the social planner's
solution, is characterized, which will provide good intuition for the more complex intergroup
model discussed in section 3. We extend the intragroup by an additional skill class and allow
for redistribution as well as economic turbulence in form of state-dependent transitions
of workers between the skill classes. After showing how the characterization of optimal
policy in the intergroup model relates to the intragroup case we present some simulation
results in order to highlight also the quantitative dimension of the results.
2 A simple intragroup model
The model is based on the standard dynamic Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)-framework
enriched by endogenous acceptance. In this section we consider only one skill class. There
are two types of rational, forward looking agents: workers and rms. Labor force L is
comprised of atomistic risk neutral workers. The assumption of risk neutrality is discussed
more thoroughly in section 2.2. There is a suciently large number of risk neutral rms
that can enter the labor market instantaneously but are subject to per-period net ow costs
c for posting a vacancy. For production each rm needs one worker who will inelastically
supply one unit of labor if employed. The three decision margins: job creation (), job
acceptance (x), and job destruction (^ x) are best understood when looking at the life cycle
of a job. First, rms decide to post vacancies according to a free entry condition which
xes labor market tightness . The search friction implies that it takes time to ll a
vacancy during which a rm has to pay per-period gross posting costs C that are reduced
by a recruitment subsidy R to c = C   R. Eventually a worker and a rm are matched
according to a matching technology m. This can be interpreted as meeting for a job
interview. Only then the agents will learn how well suited an applicant is for the specic
5job. This is modeled as drawing a job-specic productivity x from a known distribution
G(). If the realization of the draw is higher than the according reservation productivity,
referred to as 'outside' cut-o, i.e. x > x, the job is started and the rm receives a
one-time hiring subsidy H. Technically, this is one of the main dierence compared to MP
who assume that every job is created at maximum idiosyncratic productivity, trivializing
the acceptance decision because job oers are rejected with probability zero. 2 During
production the rm receives net o tax output (1   )x and an in-work benet or wage
subsidy D that partly compensates for the wage w, stemming from a Nash bargaining
game, it has to pay to the worker. A new idiosyncratic productivity shock arrives with
probability n. If a new draw is lower than the endogenous 'inside' cut-o, i.e. x < ^ x, the
job is destroyed and the rm has to pay a separation or ring tax F. To summarize the
featured instruments. Three dierent subsidies will be analyzed: a periodic lump-sum
wage subsidy (D), a one-time hiring subsidy to the rm (H), and a recruitment subsidy
(R). On the other hand we will analyze three distortionary taxes, namely: ring taxes
(F), linear output taxes (), and linear3 payroll taxes (t). An important assumption we
make is that unemployed workers cannot be taxed. Part of the value of non-work is home
production which cannot be transformed into tax revenue. This rules out non-distortionary
consumption taxation. Analytically, the model can be described as follows4.
As usual for this kind of framework an aggregate matching function m(u;v), which maps
the stock of unemployed (u) and the stock of vacancies (v) into the ow of new matches
(m), is assumed to be homogeneous of degree one with elasticity w.r.t. u of 0 <  < 1.
Dening labor market tightness as   v
u results in the matching probability functions
(2.1) and (2.2) for rms and workers, respectively.








with q0() < 0, q00() < 0 and m(u;v)  min(u;v). Further dene: qf = q()(1 G(x)) and
qw = q()(1   G(x)) as the joint probabilities of matching and accepting. A worker can
2In an alternative interpretation this relates to Hall (2005) who also allows for less qualied persons to
apply. In contrast to our analysis, he assumes that the qualication of an applicant is not completely
revealed to the employer in the rst meeting. This can only be resolved if the employer decides to costly
evaluate the application.
3The linearity assumption does not drive the fundamental results but helps to keep the mathematics
straightforward. Note that the lump-sum component of the wage subsidy going to the worker and the
linear component t can mimic a regressive or progressive tax schedule. The implementation of the ecient
allocation, as derived in section 2.2, does not require a wage subsidy.
4The notation is based on Pissarides (2000). A description of all used variables can be found in
appendix section G.
6be either employed (e) or unemployed (u), that is we abstract from transitions into and
out of labor force, hence e + u = L. Each state is associated with a specic present value,
U for being unemployed and W(x) or ^ W(x) for becoming or being employed, respectively.
A rm participating in the labor market can be in two states. Either it is looking for a
worker which has value V or it is employing a worker which gives J(x) or ^ J(x). In general,
the hat-notation always indicates that the worker or the rm has already been in the same
state before the arrival of a shock. Or put dierently, 'without hat' can be referred to as
the initial or 'outside' value while 'with hat' denotes the continuation or 'inside' value.
Given the assumption of perfect capital markets, where r denotes the exogenous interest
rate, we can write both asset equations of working as follows:
rW(x) = (1   t)w(x) + 
n
h
(1   G(^ x)) ^ W
^ e + G(^ x)U   W(x)
i
(2.3)
r ^ W(x) = (1   t)^ w(x) + 
n
h
(1   G(^ x)) ^ W
^ e + G(^ x)U   ^ W(x)
i
(2.4)
A just recently employed worker's felicity equals after tax wage income (1   t)w(x) or
(1   t) ^ w(x), respectively. When a shock arrives he loses W(x) and gains U if the new
productivity draw x is lower than the 'inside' cut-o ^ x, hence with probability G(^ x). With
probability (1 G(^ x)) he gets ^ W ^ e, which denotes the conditional expectation5 of the value
of being employed. The asset value of being unemployed is given by
rU = z + q
w (W
e   U) (2.5)
where z denotes the value of non-work which is composed of unemployment compensation
b and home production h in a linear way, z = b + h. Turning to the rms' side the asset
value of a vacancy can be written as
rV =  c + q
f (J
e + H   V ); where c = C   R (2.6)
Two subsidies enter this relationship. In case of an accepted match the rm has to give
up the value of a vacancy V but gets the expected value of a job for the rm Je plus a
hiring subsidy H. The gross ow costs of maintaining a vacancy C minus the recruitment
subsidy R give the net costs c. As free entry is imposed and V is decreasing in , in
equilibrium V is driven down to zero which will pin down , hence:
V = 0 )  (2.7)





1 G(^ x) dG(~ x). Note the dierence in notation compared to E(X(x)jx > x) = Xe.
7The asset values of a job are given in (2.8) and (2.9):
rJ(x) = (1   )x   w(x) + D + 
n
h
(1   G(^ x)) ^ J
^ e   G(^ x)F   J(x)
i
(2.8)
r ^ J(x) = (1   )x   ^ w(x) + D + 
n
h
(1   G(^ x)) ^ J
^ e   G(^ x)F   ^ J(x)
i
(2.9)
In the current period a rm receives after tax production (1   )x minus wage rate w(x)
or ^ w(x) plus a wage subsidy D6. In case of a separation, which occurs with probability n
and the probability of x < ^ x, a rm has to pay a ring tax F. Observe that given the
wage determination explained below a rm and a worker will always mutually agree to
destroy or create a job, i.e. both sides have the same reservation productivities. Hence,
the notions of a 'ring' and 'separation' tax are equivalent. The reservation productivities
are pinned down by the following conditions
J(x) + H = 0 ) x (2.10)
^ J(^ x) + F = 0 ) ^ x (2.11)
The rst relation states that after meeting for an interview and observing the match
specic productivity x, a job will only be generated if the value of a job including the
one-time hiring subsidy is non-negative. The second condition reects that a rm will only
want to continue a job if its value covers at least the ring tax. Wages are determined
via Nash bargaining and are renegotiated every time a shock arrives. The Nash wages
are given as solutions to the following optimization problems, where the weight ! can be
interpreted as the worker's bargaining power.
w(x) = argmax(W(x)   U)
! (J(x) + H)
1 ! (2.12)
^ w(x) = argmax

^ W(x)   U
! 
^ J(x) + F
1 !
(2.13)
Lemma 2.1. If F = H then w(x) = ^ w(x).
Proof. Note that w(x) = ^ w(x) implies W(x) = ^ W(x) and J(x) = ^ J(x) by construction. If
F = H, the two problems (2.12) and (2.13) are identical.
The result of this lemma is more general and can be extended to non-linear utility and
non-linear wage income taxation7. Given our assumptions the equilibrium 'outside' and
6Note that with Nash bargaining it does not matter economically whether the wage subsidy is given to
the worker or the rm but the interpretation of w changes. In our setting w and (1   t)w are interpreted
as gross and net wages received by worker already including all subsidies.
7Insert v(w(x)   T(x)) in (2.3) and v( ^ w(x)   T(x)) in (2.4), with the mild conditions v0() > 0 and
w(x)   T(x) > 0 for otherwise arbitrary functions v() and T(). The proof still holds.
8'inside' wage rates can be solved for explicitly8:
w(x) = (1   !)
z
1   t
+ !((1   )x + D + c + rH)   !
n(F   H) (2.14)
^ w(x) = (1   !)
z
1   t
+ !((1   )x + D + c + rF) (2.15)
Observe that the 'inside' and 'outside' wage distributions are directly related to the
productivity distribution G() for x larger than the respective cut-o. A wage subsidy
D will increase both wage schedules by the share the worker can claim in the process of
bargaining, !D. While a recruitment subsidy R, which is included in c, decreases both
wages to the same extent, they respond dierently to a hiring subsidy H and a ring tax
F. A hiring subsidy will increase the 'outside' wage of a worker while it does not aect
the 'inside' wage as the subsidy is already sunk by then. A ring tax will abate 'outside'
wages as rms are more cautious about hiring workers because they eventually have to
pay F. In contrast, 'inside' wages will be inated by F because rms are more willing to
hold on to workers once they are employed. The relationship of 'outside' and 'inside' wage
is simply w(x) = ^ w   (r + n)!(F   H). At last, in equilibrium the government's budget
constraint has to hold.
0 = (L   u) wt + (L   u) x + (L   u)
nG(^ x)F
  uq
wH   uR   (L   u)D   ub
(2.16)
where  w and  x denote average wage and productivity, respectively. The rst line represents
tax income from the payroll tax, the output tax and the ring tax. The second line gives
expenditure on hiring, recruitment, and wage subsidies as well as unemployment benets.
2.1 Equilibrium
The equilibrium vector hu;;x; ^ xi is pinned down by the four equations (2.17) to (2.20)9.
Equilibrium is partly recursive, i.e. only (2.17) and (2.18), henceforth referred to as the
JD-JC system, have to be solved simultaneously for  and ^ x after inserting (2.19). The
job creation (JC) curve, which is derived from the free entry condition, equates expected
gain and cost of a vacancy
JC : (1   !)

(xe   ^ x)(1   )
n + r




qf = 0 (2.17)
The rst term is the expected gain of job creation for a rm, i.e. the rm's after tax
share of excess output discounted by n + r. The gain is additionally raised or lowered
8See appendix section C for derivation.
9See appendix section C for a detailed derivation of (2.17)-(2.20).
9depending on whether the hiring subsidy H exceeds the ring tax F, or vice versa. The
second term reects the expected costs of job creation, i.e. the net ow cost c times the
average duration of a vacancy 1=qf.












c = 0 (2.18)
The rst line of the job destruction (JD) condition, which represents the 'inside' cut-
o condition, gives the lowest acceptable joint inside value of a job, i.e. the after tax
reservation product plus a wage subsidy D and the option value of keeping a worker as
her productivity might change. The second line can be interpreted as the joint outside
value, which increases in z and , as both raise the worker's outside option, and decreases
in F. The analytic relationship of the 'outside' to the 'inside' productivity cut-o is novel
compared to other studies that do not take endogenous job acceptance into account.
x = ^ x +
(n + r)
(1   )
(F   H) (2.19)
Observe that both cut-os coincide in a policy free environment where F = H = 0. A
hiring subsidy H will put a wedge between those cut-os in a way that agents more easily
accept than destroy a job (x < ^ x). A ring tax F has the opposite consequence, x > ^ x.
Having derived all three decision variables , ^ x, and x, we can compute unemployment u.
Just insert in the typical Beveridge curve (2.20), which is derived by setting the change in
u, i.e. _ u = (L   u)nG(^ x)   uqw, to zero.
u =
nG(^ x)
nG(^ x) + qw  L (2.20)
As mentioned, the recursion of the system reduces the problem to solving only two
equations simultaneously. Therefore, we can conveniently analyze comparative statics
in the JD-JC diagram10, drawn in the -^ x-space (see Pissarides, 2000). The JC-curve is
sloping downward because rms post fewer vacancies the higher ^ x, as average duration of
a job decreases in ^ x. The JD-curve slopes upward because workers want to terminate jobs
more easily the higher , as their outside options increase in labor market tightness. Hence,
the curves intersect at most once, as illustrated by gure 2.1, which makes the equilibrium
unique in case of existence. We will now shortly address the eects of uncompensated
changes in our policy instruments11. A wage subsidy D has no eect on the JC-curve
10See appendix section F.1 for more details.
11See appendix section F.2 for the analytic derivation.
10but shifts out the JD-curve. Hence, equilibrium labor market tightness  will go up, the
reservation productivities x = ^ x will fall, leading to more job creation, more acceptance
and less destruction. Therefore, unemployment will unambiguously decrease. A hiring
subsidy H works quite dierently. While there is no eect on the JD-curve the JC-curve
will shift outward. This raises labor market tightness and consequently job creation as
well as job destruction. In relation to job destruction, job acceptance is boosted, i.e. x < ^ x.
Whether job acceptance rises or falls in absolute terms is ambiguous. Proposition 2.1
states a condition for the direction of the absolute eect.
Figure 2.1: Uncompensated comparative statics












 ^ x x u
b   + = +
R + + = ?
D +   =  
H + + < ?
F     > ?
   ?12 = ?12
t   + = +
 This column gives the eect
on x in relation to ^ x.
Proposition 2.1. (Hiring subsidy and job acceptance) A hiring subsidy can lead to more or
less job acceptance. Assume for simplicity that t =  = 0. Whenever r 1!c(1 
) < n+r
the eect of H on x will be negative, leading to more job acceptance.




@H   (n + r). Inserting for
@^ x
@H derived
using the implicit function theorem and rearranging completes the proof13.
A ring tax F has very similar but inverted eects compared to a hiring subsidy H. While
the JC-curve moves inward to the same extent, additionally also the JD-curve shifts
outward as long as r > 0. Hence, if F = H rise simultaneously all shifts of the JC-curve
cancel, while the shift in the JD-curve remains.
12The sucient and necessary condition for ^ x to increase (assuming F = H and ! =  for simplicity) is:
[n + r + qwG(x)]x > [q()   n](r + n) . Hence, it is also sucient to raise u.
13r denotes the determinant of the JD-JC system which is always positive. 
 is the derivative of the
conditional expectation with respect to the cut-o. See appendix section F.1 for details.
11Proposition 2.2. (The F = H scheme) Let r > 0. Then F = H > 0 leads to more job
creation and acceptance, less job destruction and consequently reduced unemployment.
Proof. This follows directly from (2.17), (2.18), and (2.19).
The positive eect of this scheme, also described in Ligthart and Heijdra (2000) and
Heijdra and Ligthart (2002), can be explained as follows. Looking at the life cycle of a
job, a F = H scheme can be compared to an interest free loan to the rm, as it gets
H at the beginning of a job and eventually pays back the same amount without capital
user costs. The gain is therefore reected in the rF-term in the job destruction condition
(2.18). Due to the dynamic structure of the model the alternative interpretation when
considering the cross-section of rms at a specic point in time is that F = H implies
redistribution from the ring to the hiring rms. A recruitment subsidy aects both
curves. Both shift outward leading to an increase in labor market tightness, but the
JC-curve moves more strongly implying more job destruction. Compared to a hiring
subsidy which is only paid if a job is created, a recruitment subsidy is received by the
rm irrespective of whether a match occurs or not. The main consequence is that a hiring
subsidy will partly go to the worker, while the latter subsidy is already sunk in the wage
bargaining. All eects are summarized in table 2.1. These uncompensated comparative
static exercises provide intuition through which channels our policy instruments work.
In order to characterize optimal policy we have to develop a notion of eciency and we
have to close the government's budget constraint to restrict the analysis to policy that is
implementable. This is done in the next section.
2.2 Eciency and the optimal policy mix
Eciency can be distorted in many ways. We will consider two possibilities: rst, the
typical search externality that comes from the way workers and rms are matched. Second
and more at the focus our analysis, we will consider a ring externality in the spirit of
BT stemming from the requirement to nance unemployment benets which is not taken
into account by the agents. We will concentrate on this scal externality and not on the
problem of how unemployment compensation, which we take as given, should be optimally
set. Michau (2009) explicitly models the insurance problem with risk-averse workers in a
comparable setup and nds that the welfare optimum requires full insurance, i.e. w = z
and output maximization. As full insurance is incompatible with Nash bargained wages,
we condition our eciency analysis on the prior implementation of a partial insurance
system. We assume that insurance is not perfect but that b is set such that the value of
non-work z is close to the value of work14. Our model with risk-neutrality can then be
14This is also reected in the calibration choices later on.
12considered as a linear approximation of a more complex model that features concavity in
the utility function (see Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) for similar argumentation). The
quality of the approximation naturally decreases in the dierence of w and z, which as
argued above, is assumed to be small. In order to analyze named ineciencies we compute
the solution to the social planner's problem of maximizing total output15, which is given
by the following three reduced equations for socially optimal job creation, job destruction,
and job acceptance16:
(1   )










(~ x   ^ x)dG(~ x)   h  

1   
C = 0 (2.22)
x = ^ x (2.23)
Comparing those relations with the decentralized equilibrium equations (2.17)-(2.19) in a
policy free world, i.e. b = F =  = t = D = H = R = 0, reveals that they coincide if and
only if ! =  (Hosios, 1990). From now on we will follow a Ramsey approach and assume
that unemployment compensation b > 0 is exogenously given and has to be nanced
with the least possible distortions using our instruments. Subtracting (2.21)-(2.23) from
(2.17)-(2.19) gives the conditions that the policies in question have to fulll to restore
eciency.
xe   ^ x
n + r
[(1   !)(1   )   (1   )] +
R
qf = (1   !)(H   F) (2.24)















R = 0 (2.25)
F = H (2.26)
where    1
r+n
R 1
^ x (~ x   ^ x) dG(~ x). In addition, the government's budget constraint17 must
be met:
0 = (L   u) wt + (L   u) x + q
wu(F   H)   uR   (L   u)D   ub (2.27)
The important consequence from introducing a job acceptance margin is that F = H has
to hold even if the Hosios condition is not fullled18. In what follows we characterize two
15In case of risk-neutral agents the solutions to the problems of maximizing output or utilitarian welfare
coincide.
16See appendix section D for derivation.
17Note that in equilibrium the number of outows nG(x)(L   u) is equal to the inows qwu. Hence,
F = H is budget neutral in equilibrium. One should keep in mind that the introduction of a F = H
scheme shifts the JD-curve inward leading to more outow out of and less inow into unemployment.
Hence, during transition the outlay on H will exceed the revenue generated by F.
18Because of lemma 2.1 this nding also generalizes to a framework with risk-averse workers and is
independent of whether welfare or output is maximized.
13alternative implementations of the optimal allocation, one involving hiring and the other
using wage subsidies. We depict the limitations to both schemes.
Let us rst assume that the search externalities do not distort the equilibrium, i.e. ! = .
Inserting (2.26) in (2.24) reveals that output taxation and recruiting cost subsidization
are not required for eciency, hence:  = R = 0. Unemployment benets then have to
be nanced using the payroll tax t = b
 w
u
L u > 0, which is chosen to fulll (2.27). As a
compensated ring tax, F = H, is budget neutral, we can set F in order to fulll (2.25),
hence F = b+th
(1 t)r > 0.
Proposition 2.3. (Implementation 1a) In case of unemployment compensation b > 0 and
! =  it is possible to implement the optimal allocation and balance the budget using a
payroll tax, t > 0, a ring tax and a hiring subsidy, F = H > 0.
Observe the dierence compared to BT. In their framework the optimal policy consists
of zero payroll taxes and a ring tax to nance unemployment benets and oset the
involved distortions. Here, a ring tax will distort the acceptance margin unless a ring
tax is fully compensated by a hiring subsidy. As both instruments together are budget
neutral a ring tax cannot be used for nancing unemployment compensation. Instead of
the redistribution from the rms to the workers as in BT, we require redistribution from
employed to unemployed workers and from ring to hiring rms.
Now consider the case where ! 6= . Observe that at least one of the two policy instruments
 or R, is needed to satisfy equation (2.24). First we focus on output taxation, hence
setting R = 0. The ecient output tax rate is then given by  = 1  
1 
1 ! which is smaller
than zero i.e. a subsidy if ! >  and positive if ! < . Therefore, the budget-solving
payroll tax rate will be higher (! > ) or smaller (! < ) compared to the benchmark tax
rate where the Hosios condition holds. Again F is set to fulll (2.25) and therefore the
implementation of the optimal allocation is complete. Note that the case F < 0 cannot be
ruled out now. Instead of  one could alternatively use R =
xe ^ x
n+r(!   )qf by the same
argument.
Proposition 2.4. (Implementation 1b) In case of unemployment compensation b > 0
and ! 6=  it is possible to implement the optimal allocation and balance budget using a
payroll tax t, a ring tax and a hiring subsidy, F = H, and at least one of the following
two instruments: output () or recruitment (R) tax/subsidy.
MP do not explicitly consider the case of ! 6=  but it is easy to see that their job creation
curve can be moved to the optimum just by adjusting F 6= H accordingly. In our case this
is not possible as F = H is always required to oset the distortions on the job acceptance
14margin. Hence, the job creation curve can only be shifted by additional instruments, such
as an output or recruitment tax/subsidy.
The above implementations might require the ring tax to be of considerable magnitude.
This will certainly be an issue when rms are liquidity constrained, e.g. F  Fmax (see BT)
which will eventually prevent the implementation of the optimal allocation. This becomes
even more severe in the following extension. One can assume that F only partly improves
the government's budget, say by Ftax as a xed part Fcost = F   Ftax reects sunk ring
costs, e.g. the administrative costs of a lay-o, etc. Obviously, F = H is no longer budget
neutral, implying that the payroll tax t has to rise to close the budget constraint and
F = H have to be even higher to undo the additional distortion of the increased payroll
tax. Hence, it is more likely to hit Fmax.
Note that a wage subsidy D is not required for achieving eciency but possibly provides
an alternative implementation. For simplicity assume again that ! =  and set F = H =
 = R = 0. The lump-sum wage subsidy D, in addition to unemployment compensation
b, is nanced using a payroll tax t, ergo D =  wt   u
L ub. The job destruction curve will
coincide with its social optimal counterpart if and only if b
1 t + ht
1 t + u
L ub =  wt. For
u > 0 we can derive a necessary condition for the replacement ratio, namely b
 w < 1
4. The
contrapositive reads:
Proposition 2.5. (Implementation 2) In case of unemployment compensation b > 0 and
! =  it is not possible to implement the optimal allocation and balance budget using only




L ub =  wt
u>0 =) b
1 t + ht
1 t <  wt ) b
 w < t(1   t)   t h











 w < 1
4
This implementation is very specic to the way we introduced those instruments (D
lump-sum and t linear). A possible implementation with D > 0 and t > 0 would mimic a
progressive tax schedule. As this condition is hardly met in any OECD economy anyways
we shall focus on implementation 1 in what follows.
3 An intergroup model with economic turbulence
So far, we focused on intragroup redistribution. Allowing for intergroup redistribution
enriches the model considerably because it enables us to evaluate more realistic policies.
MP nd in a numerical simulation that a wage subsidy targeted at low-skilled workers and
15nanced by high-skilled workers works quite well in bringing down overall unemployment19.
Besides the connection via the government's budget constraint, they assume the two skill
classes to operate in complete juxtaposition. The issue that \targeting is likely to damage
the quality and quantity of labor supply" (Bovenberg et al., 2000) is therefore hardly
addressed. The aim of this section is to show how the optimal policy mix is altered by
the presence of economic turbulence and we nd that a scheme as proposed by MP might
be considerably less eective in such an environment. The idea that increased economic
turbulence aects labor market outcomes is related to Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998), who
assume that unemployed workers lose their skills in the course of time20 as they can not
keep up to date with new production technologies21. In a broader interpretation, these new
production techniques and requirements emerge as a result of ongoing restructuring from
manufacturing to services, spread of new information technologies, internationalization of
production, etc. which all lead to expeditious changes in the economic environment, and
render previous ways of production obsolete. Hence, a worker who is only familiar with
outdated techniques is less productive when confronted with state-of-the-art production
technology.
The key dierences compared to the simple intragroup model described above follow from
the introduction of a second skill class with the property that the productivity distribution
function of the high-skilled (h) rst-order stochastically dominates the cdf of the low-
skilled (l), i.e. Gh(x)  Gl(x) 8x. Introducing economic turbulence is modeled as follows.
High-skilled workers lose their skills conditional on job loss and during unemployment with
probability l, which means that they can only draw from Gl() when they are matched
again. Low-skilled workers, on the other hand, receive a skill upgrade during employment,
reecting 'learning-on-the-job', with probability h, which allows them to draw a new
productivity from Gh() instead of Gl(). Hence, the skill composition is endogenous. For
simplicity we assume that the skill of a specic worker can be observed by rms and the
government at any time. Hence, a rm can direct search towards the skill class which is
more protable for the rm22. An individual can be in 4 dierent states, employed with
high or low skills and unemployed with high or low skills, where we assume that total labor
19For the 'European calibration' they nd that a 20% wage subsidy decreases low-skilled unemployment
from 16.2% to 7.6% while the unemployment rate of high-skilled workers rises from 4.5% to only 4.9%.
20Empirical evidence for skill loss upon separation or during unemployment, which is often approximated
by the dierence between the old wage and the re-employment wage, is widely documented. See for
example Fallick (1996) for the U.S. and Burda and Mertens (2001) for Germany.
21This strand of the literature was initially concerned with persistence in unemployment, see e.g. Pis-
sarides (1992), Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998, 2004), and Den Haan et al. (2005).
22We abstract from undirected search, as presented e.g. in Albrecht and Vroman (2002), as it would add
an additional externality to our framework. Firms would not internalize the positive eect of employment
on the average quality of the pool of workers from which they source, which would lead to ineciently low
job creation.
16force is normalized to 1, hence: el +ul +eh +uh = Ll +Lh = 1. Transitions between these
states are illustrated by gure 3.1 and are formally reported in appendix section A.1. Note
that we now additionally allow for exogenous, productivity unrelated, separation at a rate
x, which does not provide additional analytic insight, but is important to quantitatively
match the model to the data. Besides the productivity distributions we allow high- and
Figure 3.1: The transition ows
ul el
uh eh
low-skilled workers to dier in other dimensions, like the matching technologies, as well.
Dierences are indicated by the subscript j 2 fh;lg. All the assumptions of the intragroup
model still apply unless stated otherwise. Hence, the models are nested, i.e. the intragroup
model is a special case of the intergroup model with h = l = 0 and dropped skill indices.
The asset value of unemployment for the low-skilled workers is the same as before, while
high-skilled workers lose Uh in case they are not matched with probability l and only get
Ul instead23.




l   Ul) + Ih(j)(1   q
w
h)
l (Ul   Uh) (3.1)
The value of working24 diers for both skill classes as follows. While the outside option of
a low-skilled worker is only Ul, the possibility of a skill loss has to be incorporated in the
outside option of a high-skilled worker, hence:  U  lUl + (1   l)Uh. On the other hand
only a low-skilled worker can receive a skill upgrade during work.
rWj(x) =(1   tj)wj(x) + 
x 





(1   Gj(^ xj)) ^ W
^ e
j + Gj(^ xj)
 







(1   Gh(^ xh)) ^ W
^ e
h + Gh(^ xh) U   Wl(x)
i
(3.2)
We turn to the rms' side. As the skill of the workers can be perfectly observed, rms are
23I denotes the indicator function of form Ii(j) =

1 if j = i
0 if j 6= i .
24Note that the 'inside' asset values ( ^ Wh(x) and ^ Wl(x)) are set up analogously and are not reported in
the text but only in the appendix section B for the sake of completeness.
17able to discriminate and specically post a vacancy for high- or low-skilled workers. A
rm will enter the labor market that generates higher returns. We further assume that it
can reassess this decision every period. Let us therefore dene V m  maxfVh;Vlg. The
values of posting vacancies in the high- and the low-skill market, respectively, are given as:






j + Hj   Vj

+ (1   q
f
j )(V
m   Vj), with cj  Cj   Rj (3.3)
Employing a high-skilled worker yields a per-period return of rJh similar to before, while
rJl again accounts for the possibility of a skill upgrade.
rJj(x) =(1   j)x   wj(x) + Dj + 
x [(V
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^ e
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(1   Gh(^ xh)) ^ J
^ e
h + Gh(^ xh)(V
m   Fh)   Jl(x)
i
(3.4)
Wages are again determined by Nash bargaining and are related in the following way:
wj(x) = ^ wj(x)   rj!(Fj   Hj), where rh = r + x + n and rl = rh + h. Wages now do
not only depend on their 'own' endogenous variables and parameters but also on those of
the other skill group25. Importantly, this dependence is asymmetric. While wages of both
skill classes increase in the own outside options, i.e.
@wh
@Uh > 0 and
@wl
@Ul > 0, as before, this is
not true for the 'cross terms', i.e.
@wh
@Ul > 0 and
@wl
@Uh < 0. These derivatives capture policy
spill-over of a targeting scheme. Subsidizing low-skilled workers will increase Ul and lead
high-skilled workers to bargain a higher wage as their fall back option, which includes that
they eventually become low-skilled, increases26. By contrast, if high-skilled workers are
subsidized, low-skilled workers will bargain a lower wage because working with low skills
includes the increased option value of becoming high-skilled. We will now characterize the
equilibrium.
3.1 Equilibrium
The equilibrium vector huh;ul;eh;el;h;l;xh;xl; ^ xh; ^ xli is pinned down by equations (3.5)-
(3.7) and the steady state ow equations (A.1). In comparison to the intragroup model,
the job creation conditions hardly change
JCj : (1   !)

(xe
j   ^ xj)(1   j)
rj








25See appendix section C for an explicit derivation of all four wage schedules.
26Note that is eect should be even stronger if workers are risk-averse.
18The job destruction conditions are now more involved. After dening  j  1
rj
R 1
^ xj (~ x  
^ xj)dGj(~ x), they read
JDj : (1   j)^ xj   ^ wj(^ xj) + Dj + rFj   Il(j)
h(Fh   Fl)
+(1   !)
n(1   j) j + Il(j)(1   !)
h(1   h) h = 0 (3.6)
The relationship of the cut-o productivities, representing the job acceptance decision, is
given by
JAj : xj = ^ xj +
rj
1   j
(Fj   Hj) (3.7)
Analogously to before equilibrium is partly recursive. After inserting (3.7) in (3.5) in order
to compute xe
j, one can solve the remaining JDj-JCj system of 4 equations for h, l, ^ xh,
and ^ xl. Knowing j, ^ xj, and xj enables us to solve for ej and uj using (A.1).
3.2 Eciency and the optimal policy mix
As before we start out by computing the solution to the social planner's problem, which is
documented in appendix section E. Again, eciency in a policy-free world is guaranteed if
and only if ! = . Hence, the Hosios (1990)-condition generalizes to the complex intergroup
model. We use the same Ramsey approach as before, i.e. bh and bl are exogenously given
and have to be nanced with the least possible distortion. As the implementation of the
optimum should be feasible we are bound to the following budget constraint that allows
for intergroup redistribution
0 = GBh + GBl (3.8)








Many insights from the intragroup model generalize to the extended model. First, Fj = Hj
is again a necessary condition for eciency. Second, if ! =  we do not require output
taxation j or a recruiting subsidy Rj. If ! 6=  we need at least one of those instruments.
These are important guidelines for nding an implementation of the optimal allocation for
the complex intergroup model which is a non-trivial task because of several complications.
First, even bj > 0 and bi6=j = 0 requires both payroll tax rates to be non-zero. Second,
a Fj = Hj-scheme is only budget neutral if Fl = Hh as there are no taxes paid or
subsidies received if a worker 'upgrades'. Consequently, whenever Fl > Hh the eect on
the budget is negative, if Fl < Hh it is positive. If we require Fh = Fl = Hh = Hl then the
implementation of the ecient allocation is given by the vector hth;tl;Fli that satises
the governments budget constraint (3.8) and pushes the JD-curves to their optimum,
19i.e. (C.16) minus (E.17) = 0 and (C.17) minus (E.16) = 0. If we do not require Fl = Hh
then we have an additional degree of freedom and can have many optimal implementations.
The central insight is that the idea of implementation 1 generalizes to the complex model.
Hence, the F = H-scheme is robust to the presence of economic turbulence.
3.3 Simulation
Although the theoretical treatment gives a lot of insight we will perform some numerical
simulations27 for two reasons. First, we provide quantitative evidence for the possible
welfare gain when the optimal policy is implemented. Second, we will show that the
quantitative relevance of the additional spill-over eects of targeting schemes, which arise
in presence of economic turbulence, is considerable. We will do so by revisiting the eects
of a cross-nanced wage subsidy scheme proposed by MP who nd that such a policy can
considerably increase employment and output in their 'European calibration' case. For the
sake of comparability we will focus on Germany as a representative European economy.
The rst task is to nd a reasonable calibration for the model to t German labor market
characteristics. We specify the functional forms of qj() and Gj() following MP, Den Haan




and a uniform distribution on the interval [;  ]
Gj(x) =
x   j
 j   j
(3.11)
A period is chosen to be a month. Targeting an interest rate of 5 % p.a. results in
r = 0:0041 or  = 0:9959. Nash bargaining is chosen to be symmetric as done by many
authors28. Estimates for the elasticity of the matching function vary between 0:45 (Fahr
and Sunde, 2001) and 0:7 (Burda and Wyplosz, 1994). For simplicity, we abstract from
ineciencies generated by search externalities. Hence, we set  = 0:5 in order to fulll
the Hosios (1990)-condition. The expectations of the two productivity distributions were
chosen to be E(Xl) = 1 and E(Xh) = 1:35. As data for per worker productivity broken
down into skill classes is not available, gross wage was used as a proxy by assuming that
productivities and wages are suciently proportional. During 2002 - 2006 a white collar
worker earned approximately 1.35 as much as a blue collar worker (Statistisches Bundesamt,
2007). Variances were set such that the model's wage predictions result in a wage ratio of
27The simulations were performed using MATLAB. The code is available on my website http://sites.
google.com/site/schusterphilip/.
28See Hall and Milgrom (2008) for an additional motivation of setting ! = 0:5.
20approximately 1 : 1:35. This implies V ar(Xl) = 12
12 and V ar(Xh) = 1:32
12 . A crucial choice
is the value of non-work zj which will be set as a compromise between two dierent calibra-
tion strategies. As mentioned earlier we impose linearity in the value of non-work, hence
zj = h+bj, which implies that the eects of dbj and dh are equal. We further assume that
there is no skill specic dierence in the value of home production. In line with the results
of the OECD tax-benet calculator we target replacement ratios of
bh
wh = 0:6 and
bl
wl = 0:65.
Exploiting cross-country variation, Costain and Reiter (2008) estimate the semi-elasticity





range of [2;3]. We set a common h = 0:25 low enough to hit the upper bound of the Costain
and Reiter (2008)-target, namely dlnu
d b
w
 3:229. This implies total replacement ratios of
zh
wh = 0:77 and
zl
wl = 0:87 and, in terms of productivity,
zh
av:prodh = 0:717 and
zl
av:prodl = 0:814.
Those gures are just high enough to be in line with corresponding value of 0:71 derived
by Hall and Milgrom (2008) for the U.S. using a completely dierent calibration approach
relying on estimates of the Frisch elasticity. As one would expect this number to be even
higher in Germany, because of the more generous compensation system, 0:71 seems to
be a reasonable choice as a lower bound. Hence, our calibration compromises between
both targets. It addresses the argument of Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) that the value
of non-work is substantially high, but at the same time produces a realistic responsive-
ness of unemployment to changes in benets. In order to nance the expenditure on bh
and bl we set th = 0:065 and tl = 0:05, which reects progression in the existing tax system.
The transition probabilities l and h are chosen in order to replicate the empirical skill
distribution. We use the following targets based on the publicly available statistics provided
by the German federal employment agency (Bundesagentur f ur Arbeit, 2008). Among
the unemployed the ratio of blue to white collar workers is approximately 60 %, hence
ul
u  0:6. We further target
el
e  0:2, where the low-skilled are measured as workers with
no professional education and apprentices. Given an unemployment rate of u = 0:1, this
gives a skill composition of the labor force of
Ll
L  0:25. We set h = 0:01, which implies
that it takes on average 8 years and 4 months to become high-skilled, conditional on no
job loss. A skill loss occurs after 1 year and 10 months on average, i.e. l = 0:05. Those
values are in line with the choices of Den Haan et al. (2005) and Ljungqvist and Sargent
(2004). These papers and MP also inspire the choice for the rate at which new shocks
arrive, i.e. n = 0:02. As we do not interprete the average duration of a vacancy or the
number of vacancies but just target the duration of unemployment we are free to choose









dbl = 0:73. After averaging the eects by the skill








21Ch = 1:509 and Cl = 0:274 in order to normalize h = l = 130. The probability of an
exogenous split x = 0:00668 and the scaling factors31 Ah = 0:563 and Al = 0:148 are set
to replicate an unemployment rate of u = 0:1 and average duration of unemployment of 9
months (long term averages for 1998-2007, Bundesagentur f ur Arbeit, 2008). Table 3.1
summarizes the calibration choices and results for the decentralized economy, which serves
as our benchmark.
Table 3.1: Decentralized economy, benchmark
Parameters
 0.996 bh 0.950 Hh 0.000 h 0.700
r 0.004 bl 0.750 Hl 0.000  h 2.000
! 0.500 Ch 1.509 Fh 0.000 l 0.500
 0.500 Cl 0.274 Fl 0.000  l 1.500
x 0.007 Rh 0.000 Dh 0.000 Ah 0.563
n 0.020 Rl 0.000 Dl 0.000 Al 0.148
h 0.010 h 0.000 th 0.065 h 0.250
l 0.050 l 0.000 tl 0.050
Results
type j xj ^ xj Lj ej uj duration
h: 1.000 1.345 1.345 0.740 0.702 0.038 3.524
l: 1.000 0.950 0.950 0.260 0.198 0.062 12.296
total: - - - 1.000 0.900 0.100 9.000
type Gj(xj) av. prod av. wj av. ^ wj repl. tot. repl. welfare
h: 0.496 1.673 1.562 1.562 0.608 0.768 1.108
l: 0.450 1.225 1.151 1.151 0.651 0.869 0.210
total: - 1.574 1.472 1.472 - - 1.318
Note: 'repl.' gives the replacement ratio, i.e.
bj
 wj . 'tot. repl.' is
zj
 wj . 'av.' denotes
average. 'welfare' is per-period in steady state. Other variables as in the paper.
In contrast, table 3.2 shows the results of the social optimum. Our welfare criterion
increased by 5:6 %. Unemployment is at 4 % compared to 10 %, while average duration of
unemployment should optimally be 3 months instead of 9. Comparing the endogenous
decision variables we observe two things. First, reservation productivities for accepting and
destructing jobs are ineciently high, especially for the low-skilled who reject almost every
second oer instead of one out of four which would be optimal. Second, job creation is
ineciently low. Again, this is more servere for low-skilled workers where market tightness
is about one forth of what it should be.
Implementation of the optimal allocation
30This normalization is more thoroughly described in Shimer (2005).
31The chosen ratio of Ah to Al is admittedly a little bit arbitrary but could be xed if average
duration of unemployment is known for each skill class seperately. For the time being average duration
of unemployment was set to 3 and a half months for high-skilled and a little bit more than 1 year for
low-skilled.
22Table 3.2: Social planner's solution
Parameters
 0.996 bh - Hh - h 0.700
r 0.004 bl - Hl -  h 2.000
! - Ch 1.509 Fh - l 0.500
 0.500 Cl 0.274 Fl -  l 1.500
x 0.007 Rh - Dh - Ah 0.563
n 0.020 Rl - Dl - Al 0.148
h 0.010 h - th - h 0.250
l 0.050 l - tl -
Results
type j xj ^ xj Lj ej uj duration
h: 1.821 1.239 1.239 0.850 0.824 0.026 2.248
l: 3.677 0.738 0.738 0.150 0.137 0.014 4.630
total: - - - 1.000 0.961 0.039 3.066
type Gj(xj) av. prod av. wj av. ^ wj repl. tot. repl. welfare
h: 0.415 1.620 - - - - 1.257
l: 0.238 1.119 - - - - 0.136
total: - 1.548 - - - - 1.392
Note: see table 3.1.
Let us now address possible implementations of the social optimum. We have learned
from the previous sections that in case of ! =  we do not require output taxation j or a
recruiting subsidy Rj. Further, given proposition 2.5 for the intragroup model and the
high empirical replacement ratios an implementation relying on wage subsidies does not
seem to be very promising. Hence, we try to implement the corresponding intergroup
variant of the policy scheme suggested in proposition 2.3. We proceed as follows. First
we set Fj = Hj. As ! =  the job creation conditions coincide with their social optimal
counterparts. Given Fj = Hj and bj we can now compute the tax rates tj that satisfy the
two optimal job destruction conditions simultaneously. All the possible pairs of Fh = Hh
and Fl = Hl that satisfy the budget constraint, i.e. set the budget surplus to 0, represent
an implementation of the optimal allocation. Figure 3.2 illustrates these social optimal
combinations. Moving along the optimal isoline does not only change the combination
of Fh = Hh and Fl = Hl but also the corresponding optimal tax rates as shown by table
3.2. The higher Fh = Hh the higher th has to be compared to tl. The striking result is
that such schemes involve tremendously high ring taxes and hiring subsidies. To get a
feeling for magnitude: the lowest possible value for Fl = Hl is still more than 100 times
larger than the monthly wage of a low-skilled in our benchmark case. Hence, it is of
interest how close we can get to the optimum if we are limited in the extend to which
ring taxes and hiring subsidies can be introduced as the eects presumably work in a
concave way. Consider the uniform policy case Fj = Hj = 90 representing a 'half-way'
policy mix. Payroll taxes are adjusted to satisfy the budget constraint and keep the ratio
23Figure 3.2: First best implementations in the intergroup model
(a) Budget surplus for ecient tax rates and all com-



































(b) Possible implementations of the opti-
mal allocation
Hh = Fh Hl = Fl th tl
0 131.2 -0.062 0.738
20 123.4 -0.046 0.668
40 122.4 -0.033 0.594
60 125.6 -0.022 0.519
80 131.5 -0.014 0.443
100 139.2 -0.007 0.365
120 148.3 -0.001 0.287
140 158.3 0.004 0.208
160 169.0 0.008 0.129
180 180.3 0.012 0.050
200 192.0 0.016 -0.029
th
tl constant. Such a policy gives a welfare gain of 4.4 % instead of 5.6 %. Unemployment
is reduced to 5.7 % and unemployment duration to 4.5 months. If our scheme is set to
a value of Fj = Hj = 10, which amounts to approximately 7 months of average wage,
unemployment is still reduced by 1 %-point, unemployment duration by one month, while
welfare increases by 1 %. Another nding is that our instruments allow us to trade o
welfare and employment. Consider - for example - again Fh = Fl = 10 this time as
only source of tax income and instead of using hiring subsidies, tax revenue is spent on
recuitment subsidies Rh = Rl = 0:24. Such a scheme reduces overall unemployment to
6.3 % and average duration of unemployment to 5.7 months, while it distorts job ac-
ceptance and creation and leaves welfare practically unchanged compared to the benchmark.
Cross-nanced wage subsidy schemes
We argued in the theoretical part of this section how the presence of economic turbulence
can create additional spill-over eects from targeted to untargeted workers. In this section
we try to quantify this for a particular targeting scheme, namely a wage subsidy for
low-skilled workers nanced by high-skilled workers as studied by MP. Although a policy
like that does not fulll the criteria of being optimal, MP propose it as a 'better than
nothing' scheme especially useful to reduce unemployment. We show that this conclusion
is overthrown when economic turbulence is taken into account. To have a reference point
we rst replicate the MP result in our model when turbulence is switched o, i.e. h = l.
Hence, the skill composition of the labor force is not endogenous anymore but exogenously
xed, i.e. Lh = 0:7398. To replicate our targets for unemployment, its duration and
composition we have to recalibrate some of the remaining transition probabilities32. We
32In detail, Ah = 2:23, Al = 0:28, n = 0:01, x
h = 0:0065, and x
l = 0:0185. In addition, as wages
24then rerun the MP experiment by increasing Dl stepwise from 0 to 0.5. This is done in an
uncompensated way and also if nanced by the high-skilled workers. Table 3.3 summarizes
the results.
Table 3.3: Eect of a low wage subsidy on unemployment rates
Dl change uncompensated Dl change compensated by th
no turbulence turbulence no turbulence turbulence
Dl uh ul u uh ul u uh ul u uh ul u
0.0 5.08 23.98 10.00 5.08 23.98 10.00 5.08 23.98 10.00 5.08 23.98 10.00
0.1 5.08 19.29 8.78 5.80 22.09 10.39 5.15 19.29 8.83 6.63 23.69 11.98
0.2 5.08 16.18 7.97 6.74 20.40 10.95 5.26 16.18 8.10 - - -
0.3 5.08 13.95 7.39 7.99 18.90 11.71 5.39 13.95 7.62 - - -
0.4 5.08 12.30 6.96 9.68 17.54 12.68 5.56 12.30 7.31 - - -
0.5 5.08 10.99 6.62 12.10 16.30 13.91 5.76 10.99 7.12 - - -
Note: Unemployment rates are computed in percent relative to Lj. '-' denotes break down of equilibrium.
As in MP a low-wage subsidy scheme seems to be very eective in reducing overall
unemployment, which can be brought down to 7.02 % for Dl = 0:66 in the tax-compensated
scenario. However, when we take economic turbulence into account, the results reverse. It
is striking that even in the uncompensated case, i.e. the subsidy is given away for free,
total unemployment will increase with Dl. Two eects, one boosting uh and the other
dampening the reduction in ul come into play. In a rst direct eect a rise in Dl increases
the value of working as low-skilled (Wl) and consequently the value of being unemployed
(Ul) with low skills. That is where the mechanism stops in the non-turbulence framework.
In our case additional indirect eects start to work. As Ul increases so does the fall back
option of the high-skilled workers ( U), which will raise the reservation productivities,
inate wages and therefore reduce vacancy creation for high-skilled workers. Consequently,
uh has to rise. In a third round, as the value of being high-skilled drops in relative terms
this feeds back in a negative way to the low-skilled workers as the motive of accepting a
low-wage job in order to eventually become high-skilled diminishes. A direct consequence
is that the skill composition in the labor force in shifted towards low-skilled workers. This
is the reason why such a scheme can lead to a break down of the equilbrium even for small
values of Dl if the subsidy is nanced through th as the high-skill tax base can collapse.
In conclusion, a low-wage subsidy might be useful to increase low-skill employment, but is
less eective in reducing low-skill unemployment, let alone total unemployment.
slightly dier we have to set the tax rates (keeping the relative ratio constant) to th = 0:054 and tl = 0:046.
Again, we choose Ch = 0:571 and Cl = 0:178 in order to normalize h = l = 1.
254 Conclusion
A dynamic model of equilibrium unemployment and bilateral wage bargaining is used
to characterize optimal labor market policy in a possibly turbulent environment. The
pre-policy equilibrium is distorted by a ring externality, created by an existing partial
unemployment insurance system, along three decision margins: job creation, job accep-
tance, and job destruction. We apply a Ramsey approach and try to nd a solution to
the problem of nancing exogenously xed unemployment benets with the least possible
distortions using a rich set of policy instruments: payroll, output, and ring taxes as well
as wage, hiring, and recruitment subsidies. It is shown that the optimal policy mix consists
of a payroll tax to nance unemployment compensation and a ring tax that is oset by a
hiring subsidy. The latter part can be interpreted as redistribution from ring to hiring
rms and helps to undo the distortions created by the payroll tax system. The reason
is that a 'ring tax equal hiring subsidy'-scheme, while not distorting job acceptance
and job creation, leads to less job destruction as such a policy represents an interest free
loan to the rm. The derived optimal policy mix deviates from the static framework
results of Blanchard and Tirole (2008) who argue that benets should be completely
nanced through ring taxes. This idea does not completely transfer to our dynamic
set-up. In any case a ring tax has to be compensated one-for-one by a hiring subsidy to
prevent distortions along the job acceptance margin. Hence, in the case of 'unbalanced'
search externalities that distort job creation, the failure of the Hosios condition cannot
be corrected by a spread between the ring tax and the hiring subsidy. Instead either an
output or recruitment tax/subsidy have to be used in addition.
The important feature of the derived policy mix is that it is robust to the introduction
of economic turbulence in the interpretation of Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998), i.e. skill
loss during unemployment. This is crucial as a lot of existing policy advice is rendered
considerably less eective in that case. We demonstrate this by reassessing a cross-nanced
wage subsidy scheme for low-skilled workers as - for example - suggested by Mortensen and
Pissarides (2003). While they assume skill classes to operate in complete juxtaposition,
except for the connection via the government's budget constraint, possible skill loss
during unemployment implies that high-skilled workers become more picky concerning
their acceptance and continuation decision as their fall back option, including subsidized
low-skill employment, increases. The skill composition deteriorates as a result of such a
targeting scheme and the nding of Mortensen and Pissarides (2003) that unemployment
can be considerably reduced is overthrown. In conclusion, the paper argues that instead
of redistribution from ring rms to unemployed workers (Blanchard and Tirole, 2008) or
from high- to low-skilled workers (Mortensen and Pissarides, 2003), a scheme involving
26redistribution from ring to hiring rms should be preferred.
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A Laws of motion
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(A.1)
Equilibrium states are derived by setting the left hand sides to zero.
B Unreported value functions and Nash bargaining
Unreported value functions:
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(Jh + Hh) and ^ Wh    U =
!(1   th)
1   !
( ^ Jh + Fh) (B.3)
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(Jl + Hl) and ^ Wl   Ul =
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( ^ Jl + Fl) (B.4)
or
Wh    U = e !hsh and ^ Wh    U = ~ !h^ sh (B.5)
Wl   Ul = e !lsl and ^ Wl   Ul = ~ !l^ sl (B.6)
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C Derivation of the equilibrium conditions
This section formally derives the equilibrium conditions for the intergroup model. As the
model is nested, the conditions for the simple intragroup model can be found by dropping
the skill index and setting h = l = 0. Let us rst dene ~ r = r + l, rh = r + x + n,
and rl = rh + h. Equilibrium is determined by the free entry conditions (C.1) and the
cut-o conditions (C.2).
Vl = Vh = 0 ) V















^ Jj(^ xj) + Fj = 0 ) ^ xj and Jj(xj) + Hj = 0 ) xj (C.2)
Take conditional expectation of (B.4), insert in (3.1) and eliminate Je
l using the free entry
condition (C.1) to get




Proceeding analogously for Uh results in
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We use C.4 and C.3 to solve for the dierence in the values of unemployment










To get the wage equations proceed as follows. Multiplying (B.3) by r and rearranging
gives !(1 th)r ^ Jh(x) (1 !)r ^ Wh(x) =  (1 !)r U  !(1 th)rFh. Replace r ^ Wh(x) and
r ^ Jh(x) by (B.1) and (B.2). Most of the remaining values cancel out after eliminating them
using the FOCs from the Nash bargaining (B.5)-(B.7), and their conditional expectations.
Solving for ^ wh(x) gives




Eliminating the remaining values of being unemployed, realizing that r U = r(1  

























The derivation of the 'outside' wage works analogously and results in wh(x) = ^ wh(x)  
rh!(Fh   Hh) given
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We proceed the same way to get ^ wl(x) and wl(x).
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below for the derivation. Eliminating the values of being unemployed gives
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Similar to before the 'outside' wage is given by wl(x) = ^ wl(x) rl!(Fl  Hl) knowing that
wl(x) =!

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Where the partial expectation is dened as e Gj(x) =
R 1
x ~ xdGj(~ x). Taking conditional
expectation of sh(x) = s0
h + s1
hx, eliminating s0
h by using (C.13) and inserting for s1
h
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Note that that  = 0 if Fh = Hh because it also implies xh = ^ xh as we will prove below.
Job creation conditions:
The job creation conditions are derived as follows. Subtract (B.2) evaluated at ^ xj from
(3.4) and replace ^ Jj(^ x) by  Fj using (C.2). Taking conditional expectation w.r.t. xj and
replacing Je
j using (C.1) gives the job creation curves:
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First de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R 1
^ xj (~ x   ^ xj)dGj(~ x). Subtract (B.2) evaluated at ^ xj from themselves
and eliminate ^ Jj(^ x) by  Fj again using (C.2). Use the conditional expectation w.r.t. ^ xj
of the resulting expressions ^ Jh(x) and ^ Jl(x) to eliminate ^ J^ e
j in (B.2). Evaluate again at ^ xj
and make use of (C.2) to arrive at
JDj : (1   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33Eliminating the wages and diving by (1 !) then gives the nal job destruction curves:
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Cut-o relationships:
The relation between the reservation productivities xj and ^ xj stems from a simple obser-
vation. The cut-o conditions in (C.2) in combination with (B.3) and (B.4) imply that
rms and workers will always mutually agree on creating and destroying jobs. Hence, x
and ^ x set the joint surpluses to 0. The surpluses in equilibrium are given by
sh(x) = Wh(x) + Jh(x)    U + Hh and sl(x) = Wl(x) + Jl(x)   Ul + Hl (C.18)
^ sh(x) = ^ Wh(x) + ^ Jh(x)    U + Fh and ^ sl(x) = ^ Wl(x) + ^ Jl(x)   Ul + Fl (C.19)
Note that by lemma 2.1 both surplus functions and hence cut-os coincide if F = H, a result
which even holds in a more general framework with non-linear utility and non-linear payroll
tax. Given our assumptions, observe that for the same x the dierence between the surplus
functions is given by: sj(x) ^ sj(x) =
 tj
rj (wj(x)  ^ wj(x))+Hj  Fj =  (1 !tj)(Fj  Hj),
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Hence, the relationship of the cut-os can be written as
JAj : xj = ^ xj +
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D Derivation of the social planner's optimum in the
simple intragroup model
The constrained social optimum is derived by maximizing the social welfare function ()
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We set up the present-value Hamiltonian
H = e
 rt(y + uh   Cu) + 1 [
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The optimality conditions, i.e. @H
@x = 0; @H
@^ x = 0; @H
@ = 0; @H
@u =  _ 1; @H
@y =  _ 2, imply (D.5)
to (D.9):
1   x2 = 0 (D.5)
1   ^ x2 = 0 (D.6)
From (D.5) and (D.6) we infer that the cut-o productivities irrespective of whether one
arrives at or has already been in a job coincide, i.e. x = ^ x. From now on we will just
use x. Before stating the remaining rst order conditions dene e G(x) 
R 1




x (~ x   x) dG(~ x):
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35Eliminating 1 in (D.7) using (D.5) gives
  e
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which implies the following relationships for 1 and 2:
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(1   )q()(r + n) 
(D.11)
Dierentiating (D.10) w.r.t. t and subtracting (D.10) again results in the following
relations:
_ 2 =  2r and consequently _ 1 =  1r (D.12)
Inserting for 2 and _ 2 in (D.9) and rearranging gives the reduced optimality condition






qf = 0 (D.13)
To derive the last reduced optimality condition, i.e. the job destruction condition counter-
part, we eliminate 1, 2 and _ 1 in (D.8) and rearrange:




C = 0 (D.14)
E Derivation of the social planner's optimum in the
intergroup model




 rt [yh + yl + (uh + ul)h   uhChh   ulCl]dt (E.1)
where ul = (1   uh   eh   el), subject to the evolution of the employment states _ uh, _ el, _ eh
and of total production _ yh and _ yl as given by (A.1), over the choice variables xj, ^ xj and
j. We set up the present-value Hamiltonian
H = e
 rt [yh + yl + (1   eh   el)h   uhChh   (1   uh   eh   el)Cl]
+ 1 _ uh + 2_ el + 3_ eh + 4 _ yh + 5 _ yl
(E.2)
The optimality conditions @H
@xj = 0, @H
@^ xj = 0 imply
1(1   
l)   3   xh4 = 0 and 1(1   
l)   3   ^ xh4 = 0 (E.3)
362 + xl5 = 0 and 2 + ^ xl5 = 0 (E.4)
Hence, reservation productivities have to coincide again, i.e. xj = ^ xj. For simplicity will will
just use xj from now on. Dene e Gj(xj) 
R 1
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
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and note their relationship rj j = e Gj(xj)   xj(1   Gj(xj)) which will be used frequently
in what follows. Next, we set @H
@h = 0 and eliminate 1(1   l)   3 using (E.3) to get
  e
 rtCh + 4rh h(1   )qh(h) = 0 (E.5)




and _ 4 =  r4 (E.6)
Inserting again in (E.5) gives
1(1   




_ 1(1   













and _ 5 =  r5 (E.9)
The optimality condition for yh reads e rt   4(x + n) =  _ 4. We eliminate 4 and _ 4
to get the optimal job creation condition for high-skilled jobs
(1   )qh(h) h = Ch or (1   )

xe










@yl = e rt   5(x + n + h) =  _ 5 gives the optimal low-skill
job creation condition
(1   )ql(l) l = Cl or (1   )

xe









Combine those two conditions with our expressions for the co-states to get
1(1   














@el =  _ 2, eliminate all known co-states and transform to get









h = 0 (E.13)
Note that this equation implies that _ 1 =  r1 and consequently _ 3 =  r3. Next, we
calculate @H
@uh =  _ 1 = r1 which gives
1~ r =  e
 rt [Chh   Cll] + e
 rthqh(h) h   e
 rtlql(l) l (E.14)













Insert this expression in (E.13) to derive the optimal job destruction condition for low-
skilled workers














h h = 0 (E.16)
Compute @H







reveals the optimal job destruction condition for high-skilled workers












n h = 0 (E.17)
Observe how l = h = 0 make the conditions collapse to their intragroup forms as derived
in appendix section D.
F More comparative statics for the intragroup model
F.1 JD-JC diagram
Note that the determinant of the Jacobian of the JD-JC system is always positive, as
JD  @JD
@ < 0, JD^ x  @JD
@^ x > 0, JC  @JC
@ < 0, and JC^ x  @JC
@^ x < 0, i.e. Det(JDJC) =
JDJC^ x   JCJD^ x  r > 0. The elements of the inverse of the Jacobian of JDJC













To prove that the JD-curve slopes upward and the JC-curve is downward sloping proceed
38as follows. Total dierentiation of the JD-curve w.r.t. ^ x and  gives








jJD > 0, the JD-curve is increasing.






 < 1. This is true in any case for some distributions (e.g. uniform,
normal,...) and very likely to be true for others (e.g. log-normal, with suciently small
variance)33.
Again, total dierentiation reveals that:

(1   )(1   !)
n + r
(










jJC < 0, the JC-curve is decreasing.
F.2 Policy eects























Eect: The JD-curve does not move. The JC-curve shifts outward.  ", ^ x ", x < ^ x. To














33It is easy to analytically show that for the uniform distribution 
 = 1=2;8^ x. Statements about the
other distributions are based on numerical simulations.
39Eect: The JD- and the JC-curves shift outward.  ". As the JC-curve moves stronger we















Eect: The JD-curve shifts outward and the JC-curve shift inward. ^ x #;x > ^ x. Using the














qw(1   !)[(xe   ^ x)(1   )   
(F   H)(n + r)]
(1   )(n + r)c
This expression is smaller than 0, i.e. the JC shifts inward, whenever F = H. The bigger
F in comparison to H, the smaller the inward shift.











Eect: The JD-curve shifts inward. The JC does not move, implying  #; ^ x ".
40G List of variables
Table G.1: Variable names
j = l;h subscript indicating the skill type
^ hat notation refers to 'inside'-variables
 x average productivity
 w average wage
! bargaining weight for the worker
 bound (lower) for G()
  bound (upper) for G()
G(x) cdf for productivity draws
Xe conditional expectation of some random variable X w.r.t. x
X^ e conditional expectation of some random variable X w.r.t. ^ x




 instantaneous value of non-work ( = b + h)




 labor market tightness
e mass of employed people
u mass of unemployed people
e G(x) partial expectation of productivity
g(x) pdf for productivity draws
l prob. of downgrade
x prob. of exogenous separation
qf prob. of lling a vacancy
qw prob. of nding and accepting a job
q() prob. of match for the rm
q() prob. of match for the worker
n prob. of new productivity draw
h prob. of upgrade
x productivity
R recruitment subsidy
x reservation productivity, 'outside'




 output tax rate
b unemployment compensation
C vacancy creation costs (gross)
c vacancy creation costs (net of subsidies, i.e. c = C   R)
U value of a being unemployed
J(x) value of employment for the rm
W(x) value of employment for the worker
V value of a vacancy
D wage subsidy (lump-sum)
t payroll tax rate
 weight in the matching function
41